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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASE8
The Montana Constitution provides as follows :1
"The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and
remain inviolate. .. "
In general our Supreme Court has construed this provision
as having preserved, for jury trial purposes, the distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity that existed at the time
the Constitution was adopted. Jury trial is granted as a matter
of right in legal actions, denied in equitable ones. Though sim-
ple enough on its face, application of this principle has some-
times been difficult, particularly so where a single action has
involved both legal and equitable phases.
In 1875 the United States Supreme Court said in Basey v.
Gallagher' upholding a decision of the Montana territorial court:
"Sometimes in the same action both legal and equitable
relief may be sought, as, for example, where damages are
claimed for a past diversion of water, and an injunction
prayed against its diversion in the future. Upon the ques-
tion of damages, a jury would be required, but upon the
propriety of an injunction, the action of the court alone
could be invoked."
This was obiter dictum, and it was written with reference
to the Federal Constitution,' but it was intended as a guide for
cases arising in the territory. Note that the court seemed to con-
template both legal and equitable issues arising in a single trial,
some being given to the jury and others not.
1Art. III, §23: 'The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and
remain inviolate, but in all civil cases and in all criminal cases not
amounting to felony, upon default of appearance, or by consent of the
parties expressed in such manner as the law may prescribe, a trial byjury may be waived, or a trial had by any less number of jurors than
the number provided by law. A jury in a justice's court, both in civil
cases and in cases of criminal misdemeanor, shall consistt of not more
than six persons. In all civil actions and in all criminal cases not
amounting to felony, two-thirds in number of the jury may render a
verdict, and such verdict so rendered shall have the same force and
effect as if all of such jury concurred therein."
'(1875), 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 452, 22 L.Ed ........
'U.S. Const. Amend. 7: "In suits at common law, where the value In
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined
in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the
common law."
This provision relates only to trials In federal courts and does not
require jury trial in state cases. Walker v. Sauvinet (1875), 92 U.S.
90, 23 L.Ed. 678. It did apply in Montana as a territory, however, and
thus It determined the Montana law at the time of the adoption of
the State Constitution.
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NOTE AND COMMENT
The territorial court had occasion to consider this advice
nine years later in Clark v. Baker' in which suit was brought to
foreclose a mortgage and to recover possession of a chattel in a
single action, as authorized by statute. The court recognized
that if the answer raised issues on the legal phase of the case,
a jury trial would be required and went into detail in order to
show that no legal issues were raised.
In 1902 the case of Montana Ore Purchasing Company v.
Butte and Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Company'
was decided. This being the first case subsequent to adoption
of the Montana Constitution in which the point was squarely be-
fore the court, it is of particular interest. The battleground
was over the application of Section 1310, Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 1895, which allowed a plaintiff to quiet title to premises
in controversy and restrain defendant from further trespasses
in the same suit. Tliis, in case plaintiff was in possession, as
he was in the principle case, was a new action, unknown to the
common law, and since it was one sounding in equity, a jury
trial was not considered necessary. But the court went on to
point out that if the plaintiff had not been in possession, which
he need not have been under the statute, the action would have
been no different than ejeetment, and a jury trial would then
have been required. It was further observed that if the defend-
ant, being out of possession, made an affirmative defense asking
possession, a jury trial would be required on the issues thereby
raised. The court said:
"If the plaintiff is in possession, and the defendant raise
a purely legal issue upon the right to the possession,
founded on an assertion of legal title, this issue is triable
by a jury as a matter of right."
This statement appears in the opinion on rehearing, and it
should be contrasted with the following language in the original
opinion:
"It may be stated, as a general proposition, that it is not
an objection to the jurisdiction of a court in equity that
legal questions are presented for consideration which
might also arise in a court of law. If the controversy be
one in which a court of equity only can afford the relief
prayed for, its jurisdiction is unaffected by the questions
involved .... If it took jurisdiction for any purpose, it
took jurisdiction for all purposes, and determined all
'(1884), 6 Mont. 153, 9 P. 911.
'27 Mont. 288, 70 P. 1114; modified in 27 Mont. 536.
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questions involved, whether legal or equitable, and that,
too, without the intervention of a jury, except at the dis-
cretion of the chancellor."
Both the opinion on rehearing and the original opinion
denied the right of jury trial and purported to apply the same
reasoning, yet the variation noted exists. At least one sub-
sequent case' has relied heavily on the language quoted from
the original opinion.
In Chessman v. Hale, ' decided in 1905, a jury trial was
allowed on the legal question of damages for maintenance of a
nuisance by defendant, where plaintiff asked for an injunction
in the same action. The case is significant. Notice in particular
the following quotation from the United States Supreme Court :'
"The seventh amendment, indeed, does not attempt to
regulate matters of pleading or practice, or to determine
in what way issues shall be formed by which questions of
fact are to be submitted to a jury. Its aim is not to pre-
serve mere matters of form and procedure, but substance
of right. This requires that questions of fact in Common
Law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court
shall not assume, directly or indirectly, to take from the
jury or to itself such prerogative."
Again, quoting from a California case," the opinion reads:
"It has long since been held that under our system a legal
and an equitable remedy may be sought in the same ac-
tion, and each remedy must be governed by the same law
that would apply to it if the other remedy had not also
been asked for."
The court seems to have recognized in these cases that,
whether the legal and the equitable phases became intermingled
by virtue of the plaintiff having asked both kinds of relief in
his complaint, or whether it resulted from an affirmative legal
defense or counterclaim having been interposed to a complaint
stating an equitable cause of action, or vice versa, the right to
jury trial on the legal phase is guaranteed. Except for Chess-
man v. Hale, however, they are weak as authority for that
proposition, because in the final analysis none of them pre-
sented legal issues along with the equitable.
Cases involving equitable defenses to legal claims have not
GMoore v. Capitol Gas Company (1945), 117 Mont. 148, 158 P. (2d) 302.
'31 Mont. 577, 79 P. 254, 68 L.R.A. 410, 3 Ann. Cas. 1038.
"Walker v. New Mexico and Southern Pacific R.P. Company (1897),
165 U.S. 593, 17 Sup. Ct. 421, 41 L.Ed. 837.
!Hughes v. Dunlap (1891), 91 Cal. 386, 27 P. 642.
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proved difficult. The court merely withholds the equitable
phase from the jury.'
The case of the Merchants' Fire Assurance Corporation of
New York v. Watson,' decided in 1937, states the rule on legal
counterclaims in equitable suits. This was an action by an in-
surance company to foreclose a lien securing defendant's note
for premiums on hail insurance. Defendant counterclaimed
for damages to the crop by hail, claiming benefits under the
policy. The Court held against defendant's claim of a right to
jury trial, treating the case as wholly one in equity. The Court
said that issues of fact brought into the suit by pleadings other
than the complaint, would not deprive the Court of equitable
jurisdiction taken by virtue of an equitable cause having been
stated in the complaint. When equity took jurisdiction, the
Court said, its jurisdiction was full and complete, and neither
a legal defense nor a cross-complaint or counterclaim present-
ing legal issues would divest such jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Angstman dissented on the ground that the
only controverted issues were those relating to the counter-
claim, which obviously presented facts incident to an action at
law rather than one in equity.
In a later case,' involving a legal counterclaim to a suit
to foreclose a mortgage, the Court, Mr. Justice Angstman this
time writing the majority opinion, thought that defendant
might have had a right to jury trial, but avoided overruling a
lower court decision denying one on the theory that defendant
was not harmed inasmuch as the evidence produced was in-
sufficient to have taken the issue to the jury had there been
one.
The implication in this latter case that the Court might be
varying from the rule of the Watson case is overcome by the
language used in Butler Brothers Development Co. v. Butler,'
decided one year later. Mr. Justice Angstman again wrote the
majority opinion. Jury trial was denied on a legal defense to
a foreclosure suit because the legal phase of the case was not
pressed. The opinion does not state that no legal issues were
raised, only that they were not pressed. Mr. Justice Angst-
man explained his dissent in the Watson case as follows:
"0Stanford v. Gates (1898), 21 Mont. 277, 53 P. 749.
"104 Mont. 1, 64 P. (2d) 617.
"The Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Myhre (1940), 110 Mont. 416,
101 P. (2d) 1017.
3(1941), 111 Mont. 329, 108 P. (2d) 1041.
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"The writer of this opinion dissented in that case, but
only because in that case the equitable issues stood ad-
mitted. That is not true here."
Mr. Justice Angstman's view appears to be that the
dominant issues developed by the pleadings as a whole should
determine whether the case is one at law or in equity and thus
whether or not a jury trial can be had as a matter of right.
The rule of the Watson case, on the other hand, would put the
emphasis on the complaint; if the facts set out there comprise
an action at law, there will be a jury trial, otherwise not-and
this regardless of what may be developed by the subsequent
pleadings."
As for the cases wherein both legal and equitable phases
are presented by the complaint, Chessman v. Hale is still the
law, but it has been subjected to certain limitations. Some of
the later cases suggest that whichever phase dominates the com-
plaint will characterize the whole case for jury trial purposes,
and thus seem to reject the possibility of trying one phase to
a jury and the other to the court in a single trial. For exam-
ple, in Benson-Stabeck Company v. Farmers Elevator Com-
panyt the court said:
"The grafting of the foreclosure proceeding . .. alone
upon the strictly legal issues between plaintiff and the
other defendants as makers and guarantors of the notes in
suit, respectively-the primary purpose for which this
action was brought-cannot deprive them of the right to a
trial by jury."
The case of the Truzzalino Food Products Company v. F.
W. Woolworth Company"s held that "while it is true that the
complaint asks for.equitable relief, yet the specification of in-
jury and the claim for damages are for legal relief, and it was
not error to proceed upon the legal remedy and try the cause
before the jury. '
"
4Consider the effect of such a rule: If defendant omits to set up a
counterclaim where a cause of action arises in his favor out of a con-
tract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of
the plaintiff's claim, "neither he nor his assignee can afterwards main-
tain an action against the plaintiff therefore." R.C.M. 1935, §§9144,
9138(1). Thus, where defendant's cause of action is legal and plain-
tiff brings the suit against him, the denial of jury trial on his claim
is absolute. But if defendant had brought the action instead of plain-
tiff, jury trial would have been allowed as a matter of right.
"(1923), 66 Mont. 395, 214 P. 600.
'6(1939), 108 Mont. 408, 91 P. (2d) 415.
'7See also State v. District Court (1941), 112 Mont. 458, 117 P. (2d) 494,
in which it was held that the fact an accounting was asked for in the
complaint did not "convert" the action into one in equity.
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Probably the most important decision affecting the doctrine
of Chessman v. Hale is Moore v. Capitol Gas Corporation,' de-
cided in 1945. There a jury trial was denied the defendant in
an action to foreclose the mortgage securing a note, even though
the equitable phase of the case was eliminated by a finding that
the mortgage had been lost and there was therefore no possi-
bility of granting the foreclosure. The court proceeded to give
a judgment on the debt without a jury trial. The result at first
seems to be a complete reversal of Chessman v. Hale, but the
court finds a basis for distinction as follows:
"Some cases can be found holding, or intimating, as de-
fendant contends, but they seem to be based partly upon
a confusion between an exclusive equity jurisdiction, and
a merely concurrent equity jurisdiction. Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., sections 231, 232, ff. That
is true of Chessman v. Hale, upon which defendant relies.
There the plaintiff sought two unrelated remedies; dam-
ages, which was a purely legal remedy, and an injunc-
tion, which was purely equitable. It was the presence of
the latter which gave the equity court concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the demand for an award of damages, which
however was not a necessary prerequisite to the equitable
relief demanded. Moreover, here the resort to the equity
court was not a subterfuge; both parties in good faith
asked it to determine questions which only an equity court
could determine-namely, whether the mortgage was
valid, and whether foreclosure of the lien could be had."
Three propositions are suggested by the cases: First, as
already noted, the early cases apparently recognized the possi-
bility of trying a case by the issue, the legal issues to a jury and
the equitable to the court, whereas the later cases reject this
possibility and seek instead to characterize a case as wholly legal
or wholly equitable for trial purposes. Second, the trend has
been to limit the number of situations in which jury trial is al-
lowed as a matter of right.' And, third, the premise upon which
the court has consistently relied to justify this result is the
often quoted rule that equity once assuming jurisdiction of a
"Note 5, supra.
"Numerous Law Review articles reflect the current dissatisfaction with
jury trial in civil cases. See: Snyder, Trial by Jury i8 Obsolete, 1 Am.
LwYK& 18 (1937) ; Wilcox, Trial by Jury, 25 Marq. L. REv. 66 (1941) ;
Coffin, Jury Trial, Tragic But Not Entirely Hopeles8, 25 J. Am. JuD.
Soc. 13 (1941) ; Stone, Decline of Jury Trial and the Law of Evidence,
3 Rzs JUDICATAE 144 (1947).
But such dissatisfaction is no justification for avoidance of the con-
stitutional guarantee. Most of the current comments take the view that
defects in the jury system can be corrected.
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 10 [1949], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol10/iss1/5
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cause will retain it to grant complete relief, legal as well as
equitable.
Before proceeding to evaluate these propositions, a word
should be said about the term "issue." Insofar as the discus-
sion herein uses that term, the reference is to issues of fact and
not to issues of law, the jury not being concerned with the lat-
ter. The term is defined in Section 9236, R. C. M. 1935. Al-
legations set out in the complaint or by way of affirmative de-
fense or counterclaim in the answer, and denied by the other
party, raise issues of fact; they are determined by the pleadings
as a whole. Whether an issue is legal or equitable depends upon
the allegation; and an allegation is characterized as legal or
equitable according to the subject matter, on the one hand,
whether historically legal or equitable, and according to the re-
lief asked, on the other. Thus an issue concerning trusts would
be equitable by virtue of the subject matter, one concerning a
trespass might be either legal or equitable depending upon what
relief was asked-damages or an injunction.
. The natural inference of the words of both the State and
the Federal Constitutional provisions is that there is preserved
the right to jury trial as it existed at the time of adoption of
the constitution concerned.'
Two factors determined the right to jury trial at the time
of adoption of the Federal Constitution. They were: (1) the
issue to be tried, and (2) the manner of trial. These same two
factors constitute the background against which the State Con-
stitution must be construed, since the Federal Constitution de-
termined the law in Montana at the time of adoption of the
State Constitution.
A jury trial of a legal issue might have been granted or
denied according to whether it arose at law or in equity, and a
jury trial would have been denied where a legal issue arose in
equity in connection with a matter over which equity already
The fusion of law and equity occurred in Montana before our Constitu-
tion was adopted. Organic Act of the Territory of Montana, §9,
(1894) : ". .. the said supreme and district couEts respectively shall
possess chancery as well as common law jurisdiction."
That the implications of such fusion may not have been fully real-
ized before the State Constitution was adopted should be of no con-
sequence. The State constitutional provision should be taken to have
preserved the rights of individuals then existing, though they were only
potential rights under the then state of the law and had not received
complete recognition. The problem today is to ascertain just what
those rights were, and that involves a study of the effects of the merger
of law and equity.
7
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had acquired jurisdiction.' The reason is clear: law and equity
were then administered by separate courts, and, for convenience,
equity once acquiring jurisdiction of a matter would grant com-
plete relief rather than require a separate trial on the legal is-
sues.
It would seem to follow that what the constitutional pro-
visions preserved was jury trial on legal issues when tried by
law courts but not when tried in the courts of equity, since the
method of bringing an issue to trial was a major consideration
prior to the adoption of the constitutional provisions.
But law and equity are no longer separate. In 1848, with
the adoption of the first Code of Civil Procedure in New York,
law and equity were fused. This is true in Montana.' The
manner of bringing issues of fact to trial has changed, and it no
longer has any logical significance on the question of jury trial.
Although the distinction between law and equity cannot be en-
tirely eliminated while the constitutional provision under dis-
cussion remains in effect, it is submitted that the only distinc-
tion remaining is one between issues to be tried.
If the forgoing analysis is correct, then the rule so often
quoted by the Montana Supreme Court and listed as proposition
number three above, that equity once assuming jurisdiction of
a cause will retain it for complete relief, has no longer any ap-
plication except insofar as it had so influenced the right to jury
trial before the State Constitution was adopted, that the merger
of law and equity was unable to undo it. Moore v. The Capital
Gas Company' illustrates that situation.
It follows that the right to jury trial should be determined
by the particular issue, and not by the character of the case as
a whole. Such an approach has been adopted with success by
several jurisdictions, and, though certain technical difficulties
are presented, there is no question of its practicability."
One troublesome particular should be noted in passing.
Cases arise wherein a single issue of fact has both legal and
equitable aspects. If the two phases cannot be separated, then,
' Stephens v. McCargo (1824), 22 U.S. 502, 9 Wheat. 502, 6 L.Ed. 145;
Cathcart v. Robinson (1831), 30 U.S. 264, 5 Pet. 264, 8 L.Ed. 120; Alex.
ander v. Hillman (1935), 56 S. Ct. 204, 296 U.S. 222, 80 L.Ed. 192.
"Mont. Const. Art. VIII, §28; R.C.M. 1935, §9008.
'Note 5, 8upra.
"Ford v. C. E. Wilson & Co. (D. Conn. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 163; Mas-
kasky v. Warner Brothers Pictures (E.D.N.Y. 1942), 2 F.R.D.
380; and citations listed in n. 59, CLARK, COD P r"G (2d ed. 1947)§16, p. 98. i
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since jury trial on the legal aspect is affirmatively guaranteed,
such issues should be tried before a jury, with leave to the court
to disregard the findings insofar as the equitable phase may
later become separable. Thus, in a case where plaintiff asks
both damages for past trespasses and an injunction against fu-
ture ones, the question of whether there has been a trespass will
have significance as to both types of relief asked. It is sub-
mitted that the issue should be tried before a jury, because of
the affirmative guarantee applicable to the legal aspect of the
case.
Had the Court followed the broad suggestions of the early
cases, Montana might today have a rule similar to the one recom-
mended here; as it is, the rule may still be adopted. The cases
in which the point has been raised are not so numerous that the
doctrine to be adopted can be said to be firmly fixed in our law.
The time is at hand for a thorough examination of the whole
question.
Glen W. Clark.
OLEOMARGARINE AND THE CONSTITUTION
The recent case of Brackman v. Kruse, Com'r. of Agricul-
ture, et al. (Westlake et al, interveners),' brought the Montana
Supreme Court to grips with the oleomargarine problem for the
second time. Over a third of a century ago, in State v. Ham-
mond Packing Co.,2 the Montana Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a statute which imposed a one cent per pound tax on oleo-
margarine. Its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States Today's Court, however, declared uncon-
stitutional and void so much of Section 2620.45 R.C.M. 1935, as
imposes license fees of $250 per quarter upon wholesale dealers
in oleomargarine and $100 per quarter upon retail dealers in
that product.
The statute was attacked by the proprietor of two retail
grocery stores. He alleged, in substance, that oleomargarine is
a healthful and nutritious product; that the license fees were
designed to discourage or prohibit the sale of oleomargarine in
aid of the dairy industry; that the fees were so excessive and
unreasonable as to prohibit plaintiff and more than 92% of the
other grocery stores operating in Montana from selling the
1(1948) ...... Mont ....... 199 P.(2) 671.
'(1912) 56 Mont. 343, 123 P. 407.
'(1914) 233 U.S. 331, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 985.
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